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Will the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
Create More Problems than it Solves? 
Natalia Ramirez∗ 
Various complex legal issues surfaced with the explosive and 
dynamic growth of the Internet. For example, 1999 witnessed a 
purchaser pay $7.5 million for the Internet address “business.com.”1 
This example illustrates the growing importance of Internet addresses 
(domain names) and the problem facing trademark owners who 
register their marks as domain names only to discover that someone 
else registered their mark to extract a payment. Courts recognize the 
commercial importance of domain names and thus, apply traditional 
principles of trademark law to domain name disputes. As a result, 
courts consistently favor trademark owners when one party, 
commonly known as a cybersquatter, registers a well-known 
trademark as a domain name for the sole purpose of collecting money 
from the trademark’s owner. Traditional principles of trademark law, 
however, fail to resolve the problem created when two parties have a 
valid claim to a specific domain name. This situation arises either 
because both parties own the trademark in different geographic areas 
or because they use the trademark in connection with different goods 
or services. 
In order to adapt existing principles of trademark law to the 
realities of cyberspace and to protect the goodwill of trademark 
owners, Senator Spencer Abraham introduced a bill that addressed 
cybersquatting.2 Congress adopted this bill, entitled the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), on November 
 
 ∗  J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2001. 
 1. See Andrew Pollack, What’s in a Cybername? 7.5 Million For the Right Address, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at C8. (discussing domain names sold for exorbitant amounts of 
money, including: altavista.com, which sold for $3.3 million; wine.com, which sold for $3 
million; Wallstreet.com, which sold for $1.03 million; and drugs.com which sold for $823,000). 
 2. S. 1255, 106th Cong. (1999).  
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29, 1999.3 The ACPA, as enacted, uses traditional trademark 
infringement and dilution principles to determine whether a person 
has infringed or diluted the mark in bad faith.4 The statute’s effect, 
however, merely codifies existing cybersquatting case law, which 
scarcely addresses the difficult issue created when both parties have a 
valid claim to the same domain name.  
Part I of this Note will discuss the nature of domain name 
disputes. Part II will describe some of the issues raised by the 
application of traditional principles of trademark law to domain name 
disputes, including the application of the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act. Part III will discuss the recently enacted ACPA and Part IV will 
examine whether the ACPA effectively addresses issues raised by 
domain name disputes. Finally, Part V will describe a main issue that 
ACPA fails to adequately address—the domain name registration of 
identical marks in non-competing markets. This Note will suggest a 
solution to this specific issue and will provide insights into improving 
this legislation. 
I. DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES 
A. Domain Names 
Commentators often compare the function of domain names with 
that of postal or street addresses.5 Every computer connected on the 
Internet has an assigned Internet Protocol (IP) that serves as its 
Internet address.6 A sequence of numbers separated by periods 
composes each IP address. The computer reads the numbers from 
right to left in an order of increasing specificity.7 The cluster of 
numbers separated by the periods corresponds to the network, 
subnetwork, and local address.8 People prefer letters rather than 
 
 3. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 
1536, 1501A-545 (1999).  
 4. Id. 
 5. See Michael B. Landau, Problems Arising Out of the Use of 
“WWW.TRADEMARK.COM”: The Application of Principles of Trademark Law to Internet 
Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 461 (1997).  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  “For example, for the Internet address 131.96.1.18, ‘131’ would be the network, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/15
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numbers, thus a Domain Name Service database links these numbers 
with alphanumeric equivalents called Internet domain names.9  
A domain name functions as an important client identifier, or “a 
symbol of the company’s goodwill.”10 Moreover, the unstructured 
nature of the Internet inspires some to guess the company’s Internet 
location.11 The common practice of typing the name of the company 
followed by the top level domain (TLD) “.com,” makes an intuitive 
domain name a valuable corporate asset.12 For example, an Internet 
address consists of “www.name.TLD.”13 There are two types of 
TLDs: geographic and generic.14 Geographic TLDs refer to the 
geographical region of the organization.15 Generic TLDs refer to the 
type of organization that registered the domain name.16 For example, 
generic TLDs include: “.com” for commercial institutions; “.edu” for 
educational institutions; “.net” for network providers; “.gov” for 
governmental institutions; and “.org” for organizations.17 Most 
domain name disputes emerge over “.com” TLDs.18  
 
‘96’ and ‘1’ refer to the subnetworks, and “18” refers to the local computer.” Id. 
 9. Id.; see also, Joan Meadows, Comment, Trademark Protection for Trademarks Used 
as Internet Domain Names, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (1997). 
 10. Sally M. Abel, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave New Frontier, 528 
PLI/PAT 323, 333 (1998). 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property 
Rights and Personal Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 58 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 911, 920 (1997). 
 15. Id. at 921. 
 16. See Abel, supra note 10, at 334 n.1. “Generic TLDs are commonly misunderstood to 
be U.S. only. However, they are international in nature, so only one pitt.edu exists in the entire 
world. This global reach explains why generic TLDs have become so coveted.” Nathenson, 
supra note 14, at 922. 
 17. See Abel, supra note 10, at 324; see also Meadows, supra note 9, at 1332.  
 18. See Landau, supra note 5, at 462. Landau suggests that most domain name disputes 
arise in the “.com” TLD because “it is within this domain that parties who do not have any legal 
rights in a trademark have included another’s trademark in their domain name.” Id. Third 
parties profit from realizing that use of the “.com” TDL’s by commercial institutions transforms 
a domain name into a valuable client identifier. See Abel, supra note 10, at 333. “Not 
surprisingly, the .com TLD, intended for commercial users has experienced exponential growth 
in the recent past: there are now close to two million such domain names. As would have been 
expected from such growth, the .com TLD is at the eye of the storm in domain disputes.” Id. at 
334. 
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B. Domain Name Registration System 
Domain names are assigned on a first come, first served basis.19 
Currently, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) manages the registration of 
domain names in the generic TLDs for the U.S. government.20 The 
contract between NSI and the government expired in 1998.21 The 
contract, however, was extended until September 30, 2000 while the 
government transferred the responsibilities to a new, nonprofit 
organization.22 This new non-profit organization, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), adopted a 
mandatory dispute resolution procedure for “cybersquatters.”23 The 
procedure focuses on reverse domain name hijacking where a large 
trademark owner threatens to sue an individual or small business over 
their domain name, even though the smaller entity has a legitimate 
interest in the name.24 
Under the current dispute policy,25 the owner of a federal 
 
 19. Abel, supra note 10, at 334; see also, Danielle Weinberg Swartz, Comment, The 
Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Domain Name Disputes, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 
1490 (1998). 
 20. Nathenson, supra note 14, at 923. While geographic domain names are issued by the 
authorities in each country, NSI issues generic domain names as part of the InterNIC. Id. 
InterNic was established in 1993 under the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation. Id. 
at 923 n.44. This Note, however, does not address geographic domain names. 
 21. 57 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 1412, at 307 (1999). 
In July of 1997, President Clinton directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize the 
domain name system. 62 Fed. Reg. 35896, 54 PTCJ 195, 204, 7/3/97. In January of 
last year the Commerce Department released its “green paper” recommending a 
transfer of the administration and allocation of Internet addresses to a single not-for-
profit corporation. Id. Last June, the Commerce Department issued a revised “white 
paper” that renewed the call for private-sector governance of domain name 
registration, with the switch-over completed by September 30, 2000. 
Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 58 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 1440, at 530-31 (1999).  
On November 25, ICANN entered into an agreement with the Commerce Department 
to complete the transfer of this responsibility from the government to the private 
sector. Under that agreement, ICANN was charged with a number of tasks, including 
the development of a plan for introducing competition into the domain name 
registration business. 
Id.  
 24. 58 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 1440, at 530 (1999).  
 25. Abel, supra note 10, at 341.  
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trademark registration or a registration in a foreign country may 
challenge the use of an identical domain name by submitting a 
registration certificate to the NSI.26 The trademark owner must also 
submit proof that he has: 
sent the domain holder written notice of the trademark owner’s 
claim that the use and registration of the domain name violates 
the trademark owner’s legal rights. If the “creation date” of the 
domain postdates the “effective date” of the trademark 
registration, then NSI gives the domain holder 30 days to 
prove its ownership of a trademark registration for the same 
mark in the U.S. or any foreign country. If the domain holder 
is able to prove either (1) that the creation of the domain name 
predates the effective date of the challenger’s trademark 
registration, or (2) that the domain name holder has its own 
trademark registration, then the domain holder will be able to 
keep the domain. If, however, the domain holder cannot 
demonstrate the required prior creation date, or produce a 
trademark registration certificate, then the domain holder must 
give up the domain, with a ninety-day transition period if the 
domain holder cooperates. The disputed domain then goes into 
a “hold” status, where it is not available to anyone, pending the 
resolution of the dispute between the parties.  
This procedure, wherein the domain is frozen, created a number of 
disputes.  
When assigning a domain name, NSI exercises veto power over 
requested names that are not identical to names already assigned.27 
This creates a problem because NSI does not conduct a search to 
determine whether a third party is registering a trademark as a 
domain name.28 Consequently, trademark owners bear the 
responsibility of policing their trademarks to ensure that their 
trademarks are not infringed or diluted.  
 
 26. Kimberly W. Alacantara, Trademarks in Cyberspace, 569 PLI/PAT 425, 341 (1987). 
 27. Abel, supra note 10, at 334-35. 
 28. Alacantra, supra note 26, at 429, 484 (Network Solution domain Dispute Policy 
Present and Future).  
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II. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK LAW 
A. General Principles 
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act to facilitate the 
regulation of trademarks.29 The Lanham Act has two main purposes: 
(1) to protect consumers from being confused as to the source of 
goods and services; and (2) to protect a trademark holder’s goodwill 
and investment by prohibiting the misrepresentation of goods and 
services.30 Moreover, trademarks ensure a consistent level of quality 
to the purchasing public.31  
B. Trademark Infringement 
Although registration is not necessary for the protection of a 
trademark, obtaining a trademark registration provides several 
advantages. Specifically, it constitutes prima facie evidence of both 
the validity and ownership of the mark and of the right to use the 
mark in commerce.32  
Generally trademarks are classified under one of four categories: 
(1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or 
 
 29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 (1994): see Meadows, supra note 9, at 1327. It is important to 
understand the relationship between common law and federal law. “Trademarks that are used 
locally or intra-state are protected under common law.” See Landau, supra note 5, at 463. Only 
those trademarks used in interstate commerce, however, may receive protection under federal 
law. Nevertheless, the same standards for protection apply under both common law and federal 
law. Id. 
 30. Meadows, supra note 29, at 1327.  
 31. Swartz, supra note 19, at 1490.  
 32. See Landau supra note 5, at 466-67.  
With a registration, the burden is on the trademark challenger to prove the facts related 
to the protectability of the mark. Registration also gives the trademark owner: (1) the 
right to prevent the importation of counterfeit goods; (2) the opportunity to initiate an 
action under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) to prevent the use of counterfeit marks; and (3) the 
opportunity to take advantage of § 15 of the Lanham Act where a registered mark may 
become incontestable after five years of continuous post-registration use. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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fanciful.33 Generic marks are trademarks that represent the good or 
service itself, and they may never acquire trademark protection. 
Descriptive marks merely “convey an immediate idea of the 
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods” instead of 
identifying the source of those goods.34 Thus, a descriptive mark 
receives protection only if it acquires a “secondary meaning” which 
identifies the source of the goods.35 In contrast, suggestive and 
arbitrary or fanciful marks are inherently distinctive, and thus they 
receive protection immediately upon their use.36 “A trademark is 
‘suggestive’ if it ‘requires “imagination, thought and perception to 
reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.’”37 “A trademark is 
arbitrary or fanciful if it ‘has no inherent relationship to the product 
or service with which it is associated.’”38  
A successful trademark infringement claim requires a plaintiff to 
establish two elements: (1) prior rights in the trademark; and (2) that 
the unauthorized use of the trademark will likely cause consumer 
confusion, deception, or mistake.39 This second factor, known as the 
likelihood of confusion test, is the touchstone of trademark 
infringement.40 Although the standard to determine likelihood of 
confusion varies among the federal circuits, the Ninth Circuit 
developed a balancing test that incorporates eight factors: 
(1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the proximity of the goods; 
(3) the marketing channels used; (4) the defendant’s intent in 
selecting the mark; (5) the type of goods and the degree of care 
likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (6) the evidence of 
 
 33. See Mark V. B. Partridge, A Review of Recent Trademark and Unfair Competition 
Cases in the U.S., 38 IDEA 57, 58 (1997); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 
537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).  
 34. Landau, supra note 5, at 465. (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 
763 (1992) (alteration added)).  
 35. See id. A trademark acquires secondary meaning when it becomes “associat[ed] with 
particular goods stemming from a particular source.” Id. (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (alteration in original)).  
 36. Id. at 464 (citation omitted).  
 37. Id. at 464-65 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11.21[1] (3d ed. 1996)).  
 38. Id. at 464 (citing John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 974 (11th 
Cir. 1983)).  
 39. Swartz, supra note 19, at 1496; see 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).  
 40. Swartz, supra note 19, at 1496-97.  
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actual confusion; (7) the strength of the mark; and (8) the 
likelihood of expansion of the product lines.41 
C. Legitimate Uses of a Mark by Multiple Parties 
The rights of registered trademark owners are not absolute.42 A 
federal registration does not confer an absolute right to enjoin all U.S. 
parties who might use the same mark.43 Thus, a court will find 
trademark infringement only if there is a likelihood of confusion.  
Absent a likelihood of confusion, there are two circumstances in 
which trademark law explicitly allows for multiple parties to use the 
same mark.44 First, when the marks are used in connection with 
similar goods in different geographic markets, multiple parties may 
use the same mark.45 This situation is known as “concurrent use.”46 
Second, multiple parties may use the same mark in connection with 
different goods.47  
 
 41. Id. at 1496-97; see also, AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 
1979).  
 42. Landau, supra note 5, at 468.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994). 
No trademark . . . shall be refused registration on the principal register . . . unless it—
. . . (d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark as to be likely, 
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive: Provided, That if the Commissioner determines that 
confusion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the continued use by more 
than one person of the same or similar marks under conditions and limitations as to the 
mode or place of use of the marks of the goods on or in connection with which such 
marks are used, concurrent registrations may be issued to such persons when they have 
become entitled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent lawful use in 
commerce . . . . Concurrent registrations may also be issued by the Commissioner 
when a court of competent jurisdiction has finally determined that more than one 
person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce. In issuing concurrent 
registrations, the Commissioner shall prescribe conditions and limitations as to the 
mode or place of use of the mark of the goods on or in connection with which such 
marks is registered to the respective persons. (emphasis added). 
In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 474 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that the senior user can 
receive registration covering all parts of the United States except those regions where the junior 
user can establish existing rights in its actual area of use or zones of natural expansion).  
 47. Landau, supra note 5, at 468. 
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Additionally, trademark law recognizes the rights of a local 
intrastate party to continue using a mark despite the acquisition of a 
federal registration by a larger party who uses the mark in interstate 
commerce.48 When a local user uses the mark before the interstate 
user, then the local user’s rights to the mark are geographically 
fixed.49 This policy prevents large parties with vast amounts of 
resources from appropriating local users’ marks and preventing the 
original local user from using the mark.50 Conversely, when the local 
user uses the mark in a defined geographic area after another user 
registers that mark, the local user receives “constructive notice” of 
the rights of the registrant.51 If the registrant subsequently expands 
into the territory of the local user, then the local user may be 
enjoined.52  
When a mark is used in connection with different goods, both 
parties may register that same mark, provided the goods and/or 
services are sufficiently different, such that no likelihood of 
confusion exists.53 For example, both an airline and a faucet 
manufacturer use the same mark, “DELTA,” to identify different 
goods and services.54  
D. Trademark Dilution 
Prior to the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(FTDA),55 a majority of the states had anti-dilution statutes.56 Courts 
defined “dilution” as “the gradual whittling away of a distinctive 
trademark or trade name.”57 State law recognized two distinct types 
of dilution: blurring and tarnishment.58 Blurring arises when the 
defendant uses or modifies the plaintiff’s mark to identify the 
 
 48. Landau, supra note 5, at 469. 
 49. See id. at 468. 
 50. Id. at 469-70.  
 51. Id. at 470. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 470-71. 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998).  
 56. Karen S. Frank, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 Protecting Fame and 
Fortune, 454 PLI/PAT 523, 529 (1996).  
 57. Id. at 529 (citations omitted).  
 58. Id. (citing Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods. Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).  
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defendant’s goods, which are different from those of the plaintiff, in 
such a way that the mark may no longer be associated with the 
plaintiff’s product.59 In contrast, tarnishment arises when the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark degrades the quality of the 
plaintiff’s mark.60  
In order to avoid the patch-quilt protection against dilution 
provided by different state statutes, Congress adopted the FTDA in 
1995.61 The FTDA adds a new section to the Lanham Act, § 43(c).62 
Under the FTDA, the owner of a diluted, famous trademark is 
entitled to a nation-wide injunction.63 If the owner of the famous 
mark, however, establishes that the third party willfully intended to 
trade upon the reputation or goodwill of the famous mark, the owner 
is also entitled to traditional trademark infringement remedies.64 
These remedies include restitution of defendant’s profits and 
damages sustained by the plaintiff.65 
Since its enactment, courts willingly apply the FTDA to resolve 
domain name disputes.66 Indeed, many commentators believe that the 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (citing Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Enter’t Group Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1478 
(W.D. Wash. 1996)).  
 61. Id. at 525. Legislative history indicates that the FTDA did not intend to preempt state 
statutes. Id. The FTDA, however, specifically provides that a cause of action for dilution under 
state law shall not be available against marks that are federally registered. Id. at 525-26. 
 62. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).  
 63. Id. at 526. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. President Clinton signed the FTDA into law on January of 1996. The FTDA 
amended § 43 of the Lanham Act by adding a new § 43(c) to prevent the dilution of famous 
marks.   
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and 
upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another 
person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins 
after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining 
whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not 
limited to–  
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; 
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services 
with which the mark is used;  
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/15
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FTDA is the strongest weapon against the unauthorized use of a 
trademark as a domain name.67 Moreover, the legislative history 
indicates that the intent of the FTDA was to resolve domain name 
disputes.68  
Courts applied the FTDA to domain name disputes in two recent 
cases. In Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group Ltd.,69 the 
court applied the FTDA to a domain name dispute where both parties 
legitimately used the same mark. Hasbro, the owner of the trademark 
 
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the marks is used; 
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade 
used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; 
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and 
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act . . . or on the principal register. 
Id. The FTDA also amended § 45 to include a definition of dilution which is defined as “the 
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish the goods or services, 
regardless of the presence or absence of– 
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or  
(2) likelihood of confusion,  mistake, or deception.” 
Id.  Unlike a claim for trademark infringement, a claim for dilution under § 43(c) does not 
require a finding of likelihood of confusion. Id.  
 This difference facilitates proving dilution despite the defendant’s use not satisfying the 
traditional test for likelihood of confusion. Often times, this situation arises when a defendant 
uses a mark in connection with completely unrelated goods and services or in a different 
geographic area. See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(exemplifying the problem courts may encounter when interpreting the FTDA, specifically, that 
judges will extend more protection than granted by statute).  
 Prior to enacting the FTDA, a majority of states recognized a cause of action for dilution, 
either under common law or under a state anti-dilution statute. Under state law, two different 
types of dilution existed: blurring and tarnishment. Blurring is when the exclusivity of a mark 
becomes diminished. Tarnishment is when the mark is used in an unsavory sense. The 
legislative history, however, indicates that the massive inconsistencies between states led to the 
FTDA’s enactment and purpose of avoiding forum shopping. For purposes of this Note, it is 
important to realize that another purpose of the FTDA was to “help stem the use of deceptive 
Internet addresses by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and 
reputations of others.” Intermatic, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1421 (quoting remarks of Sen. 
Patrick J. Leahy in the U.S. Senate, Dec. 29, 1995, CONG. REC. S. 19312 (1995)). Michael B. 
Landau notes, however, that the Senator’s remarks are not accurate because if the use of a mark 
is deceptive, it could potentially withstand traditional trademark infringement or unfair 
competition inquiries. Landau, supra note 5, at 478 n.89. 
 67. Landau, supra note 5, at 478.  
 68. Frank, supra note 56, at 532; see also, Landau, supra note 5, at 479.  
 69. 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996). 
Washington University Open Scholarship










406 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 8:395 
 
 
“CANDYLAND” for children’s board games, brought a complaint 
against the registrant of the adult-oriented Web site “candyland. 
com.”70 The Court held that Hasbro’s mark was famous and 
therefore, issued a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
injunction ordering the defendant to change its Web site to a different 
Internet address.71 In Toys ‘R’ US, Inc. v. Akkaoui,72 Toys ‘R’ US 
brought an action against the registrant of the domain name 
“adultsrus.com,” a Web site that sold sexual devices and clothing.73 
The court held that the domain name diluted the Toys ‘R’ US family 
of marks and granted a preliminary injunction against the 
defendant.74  
While the FTDA may be the strongest weapon against domain 
name disputes, its broad language unleashes a host of problems. 
Specifically, courts are split on two questions: (1) what qualifies as a 
“famous mark” under the statute, and thus, what is entitled to 
protection against dilution of its distinctive nature; and (2) what is 
necessary to prove dilution.  
Although a court may consider numerous factors when 
determining whether a mark is famous, several problems become 
evident.75 First, the enumerated factors are not determinative of a 
mark’s fame. Thus, a court may select the factors it applies. Second, 
the list of factors is not exhaustive. As such, some courts virtually 
ignore the factors and apply their own standards.76 Therefore, the 
danger exists that courts will broadly misapply the term “famous” 
and protect marks that should not receive protection. For example, in 
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,77 the District Court of 
California stated that “[t]rademark dilution laws protect ‘distinctive’ 
or ‘famous’ trademarks from certain unauthorized uses of the marks 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1479-80. 
 72. 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1936 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 73. Id. at 1837. 
 74. Id. It is important to note that both of these cases have dealt with non-competing uses. 
Id.; see also Hasbro, supra note 69. The underlying concern in both cases, however, was likely 
that children could mistakenly reach these adult-oriented Web sites.  
 75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  
 76. See, e.g., Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 520-21 (M.D. Pa. 
1998); Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Haw. 1996).  
 77. 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
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regardless of a showing of competition or likelihood of confusion.”78 
The inaccuracy of this statement illustrates the diverging results 
caused by the statute’s broad language.79 
Courts also disagree over the test to apply when determining 
whether a plaintiff established a cause of action for dilution. A 
majority of courts apply a “likelihood of dilution” test.80 In contrast, 
the Fourth Circuit in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined 
Shows v. Utah Division of Travel Development81 rejected the 
likelihood of dilution standard. Instead, the court required a showing 
of actual dilution.82 The court analyzed the statutory language of 
§ 43(c) and concluded that because the statute applies to marks that 
cause dilution, the language requires more than a mere likelihood of 
dilution.83 
III. THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
A. Purposes of the Statute 
The purpose of the ACPA is to protect consumers and promote 
electronic commerce.84 The Congressional Record reflects that the 
 
 78. Id. at 1301 (citations omitted).  
 79. Note that the court misconstrued the statute, which protects “famous” marks not 
“distinctive” marks from being diluted. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998). 
 Clearly a distinctive mark is not the same as a famous mark. By definition, all 
trademarks must be distinctive. A famous mark will always be distinctive, but a 
distinctive mark need not be famous. If courts confuse or interchange distinctive with 
famous, there is a danger that all marks will become protected under the dilution 
doctrine, thus requiring the application of the likelihood of confusion test, and 
eliminating the long established policy of different parties using similar or identical 
marks in connection with different goods.  
Landau, supra note 5, at 478-79. 
 80. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
 81. 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 82. Id. at 464. 
 83. Id. at 458-61. 
 84. 145 CONG REC. S7325 (daily ed. June 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Abraham). On 
June 21, 1999, Senator Spencer Abraham introduced the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (ACPA). The Committee on Judiciary recommended that the Senate pass the bill 
as amended. Senator Brownback reported this amendment to the Senate which passed the 
Senate by unanimous consent on August 5, 1999. 145 CONG. REC. S10513. (daily ed. Aug. 5, 
1999) (statement of Sen. Brownback). After deliberation, the House of Representatives struck 
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main concern of the ACPA is to protect the goodwill of trademark 
owners. Almost every Representative and Senator who submitted 
comments, recognized the problems created when individuals register 
well-known marks as a domain name with the intent of exchanging 
their rights to the domain name for money.85 Moreover, § 2 of the 
ACPA, entitled “Findings,” specifically limited the application of the 
Act to “domain name[s] that [are] identical without regard to the 
goods or services of the parties.”86 The amendments contained this 
provision, but if it remained part of the Act, it would not apply to 
those situations where a party registers a domain name that is 
confusingly similar to a “famous” mark. This may impact how courts 
construe the statute. 
 
everything after the enacting provision and replaced it with the provisions of a similar measure, 
H.R. 3028 entitled Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act. 145 CONG. REC. S10513 (daily ed. 
Aug. 5, 1999). Finally, the bill passed, and President Clinton signed into law an omnibus budget 
bill that included significant new intellectual property provisions, including the ACPA. 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536, 
1501A-545 (1999). 
 85. 145 CONG. REC. H10823 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1999) (statements of Rep. Coble, Rep. 
Berman, Rep. Boucher, and Rep. Bono). 
 86. S. 1255, at S10514 (Aug. 5, 1999). 
SEC. 2 FINDINGS 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) The registration, trafficking in, or use of a domain name that is identical without 
regard to the goods or services of the parties, with the bad-faith intent to profit from 
the goodwill of another’s mark (commonly referred to as “cyberpiracy” and 
“cybersquatting”)— 
 (A) results in consumer fraud and public confusion as to the true source or 
sponsorship of goods and services; 
 (B) impairs electronic commerce, which is important to interstate commerce and the 
U.S. economy;  
 (C) deprives legitimate trademark owners of substantial revenues and consumer 
goodwill; and  
 (D) places unreasonable, intolerable, and overwhelming burdens on trademark 
owners in protecting their valuable trademarks.  
(2) Amendments to the Trademark Act of 1946 would clarify the rights of a 
trademark owner to provide for adequate remedies and to deter cyberpiracy and 
cybersquatting. 
Id. at S10514. 
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B. Standards for Actionable Conduct 
Section 2(a) of the ACPA amends the Lanham Act87 to provide a 
trademark remedy for “cybersquatting” in § 43(d).88 In effect, the 
 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1994).  
 88. 145 CONG. REC. 10823 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1999). 
SEC 2. CYBERPIRACY PREVENTION 
(a) IN GENERAL—Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. § 1125) is 
amended by inserting at the end the following: 
(d)(1)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a 
famous personal name which is protected under this section, if, without regard to the 
goods or services of the parties, that person— 
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a famous personal name 
which is protected under this section; and  
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that— 
 (I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain 
name is identical or confusingly similar to that mark; 
 (II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the 
domain name, is dilutive of that mark; or  
 (III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of title 18, 
United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States Code. 
  (B) in determining whether there is bad-faith  
intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not 
limited to— 
 (i) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the 
domain name;  
 (ii) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person or 
a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person; 
 (iii) the person’s prior lawful use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the 
bona fide offering of any goods or services;  
 (iv) the person’s lawful noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible 
under the domain name; 
 (v) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online location to 
a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by 
the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the 
mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, 
or endorsement of the site; 
 (vi) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the 
mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an 
intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services; 
 (vii) the person’s provision of material and misleading false contact information 
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amendment incorporates the likelihood of confusion test, an 
alternative dilution standard, and adds a bad-faith test.89 To prevail 
under a § 43(d)(1)(A) claim, a plaintiff needs to prove that: (1) a 
party has a bad faith intent to profit from the mark; and (2) a party 
registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that would either create a 
likelihood of confusion or dilute the mark.90 Notice that this two-
prong test introduces the concept of “bad faith intent to profit.”91 
The language preceding the bad-faith standard, however, reads: 
“A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, 
including a famous personal name which is protected under this 
section . . . .”92 Therefore, only parties who own a mark or who own a 
“famous personal name” may bring a claim under the ACPA, which 
places a premium on registering marks.  
Whether a court will inquire into the intent of both parties, or just 
one, is unclear from the “bad faith intent to profit” requirement. 
Additionally, the Act does not define “profit from that mark.” 
Clearly, if the top level domain name is a “.com,” then its ultimate 
purpose is commercial use and profit is reasonably expected. The 
 
when applying for the registration of the domain name or the person’s intentional 
failure to maintain accurate contact information;  
 (viii) the person’s resignation or acquisition of multiple domain names which the 
person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are 
distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous 
marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, 
without regard to the goods or services of such persons;  
 (ix) the person’s history of offering to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign domain 
names incorporating marks of others to the mark owners or any third party for 
consideration without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain names in 
the bona fide offering of any goods and services; 
 (x) the person’s history of providing material and misleading false contact 
information when applying for the registration of other domain names which 
incorporate marks, or the person’s history of using aliases in the registration of 
domain names which incorporate marks of others; and  
 (xi) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s domain name 
registration is distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) of § 43 
of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. § 1125). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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term “profit,” however, was most likely referring to those situations, 
like in Panavision,93 where the defendant registers famous marks as 
domain names, and then sells them to their rightful owners for a 
profit. Pursuant to Senator Leahy’s explanation, however, the courts 
have “had little trouble dealing with a notorious cybersquatter, 
Dennis Toeppen from Illinois, who registered more than 100 
trademarks—including ‘yankee stadium.com,’ ‘deltaairlines.com,’ 
and ‘neiman-marcus.com’—as domain names for the purpose of 
eventually selling the names back to the companies owning the 
trademarks.”94 If profit is extracting a payment from the trademark 
owner in exchange for the rights to use the domain name, then this 
act is argubly limited to situations like the ones faced by the court in 
Panavision,95 and Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen.96 This interpretation of 
the ACPA will depend upon the courts’ interpretation of its language.  
The FTDA not only provides a list of factors that a court may 
consider when determining whether a mark is famous, but the ACPA 
also provides a list of factors that a court may consider when 
determining whether there is bad-faith intent.97 Similarly, both 
 
 93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 94. 145 CONG REC. S10513, S10517 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statements of Sen. Leahy). 
 95. See 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1936 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 96. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 97. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1124; Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545 (1999). The ACPA contemplates the continued 
application of traditional trademark principles, including likelihood of confusion and dilution. 
See id. § 2(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I), 2(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II). The likelihood of confusion standard is adopted in 
the context of domain name disputes in § 2(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) of the ACPA and states that:  “[a] 
person shall be liable . . . if . . . that person . . . (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name 
that—[I] in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name, 
[II] is identical or confusingly similar to that mark.” 145 CONG. REC. H10823 (daily ed. Oct. 
26, 1999). This standard adopts a two prong test: (1) a party must register, traffic in, or use a 
domain name that is “identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark”; and (2) that mark 
must be “distinctive at the time of the registration of the domain name.” Id. The first prong is 
the traditional likelihood of confusion test, while the second prong’s ascertainment may present 
more difficulties. The ACPA adopted dilution standard in 2(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II) and states that: “[a] 
person shall be liable . . . if that person . . . (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name 
that—[1] in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain 
name, [2] is dilutive of that mark.” Id. Like the likelihood of confusion test, this standard adopts 
a two prong test: (1) a party must register, traffic in, or use a domain name that dilutes a famous 
mark; and (2) the mark being diluted must be famous at the time of registration of the domain 
name. Id. To determine whether a mark is famous, a court may apply the factors listed in 
§ 43(c) of the Lanham Act. The broadness of that statute, however, leads courts to inconsistent 
decisions. 
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explicitly state that the list is non-exhaustive. The Congressional 
Report indicates that the eleven factors listed in the ACPA 
presumably balance the property interests of trademark owners 
against the legitimate interests of Internet users.98 The first four 
factors pertain to circumstances that suggest the absence of a bad-
faith intent to profit from the marks of others, while the remaining 
seven factors pertain to circumstances that suggest the presence of a 
bad-faith intent to profit from the marks of others.99 
IV. DOES THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE ISSUES RAISED BY DOMAIN NAME 
DISPUTES  
Inconsistencies between trademark law and the structure of the 
Internet create a myriad of issues unaddressed by the ACPA. While 
domain names do not necessarily constitute a trademark, a trademark 
or service mark may be registered as a domain name.100 Therefore, 
use of another’s trademark may constitute either infringement or 
dilution.  
The domain name system illustrates a fundamental dichotomy 
between trademark law and the complexities of Internet technology: 
 
 98. 145 CONG. REC. H10823, 10825 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1999). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). The Lanham Act defines a trademark as: 
“any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof— 
 (1) used by a person, or  
 (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to 
register on the principal register established by this chapter, (this is part of the above 
paragraph) to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from 
those manufactured or sold by others . . . .” Id.  
(Separate paragraph) Similarly, the Lanham Act defines a “service mark” as  
 “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof- 
 (1) used by a person, or 
 (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to 
register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish 
the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others and 
to indicate the source of the services . . . .”  
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). For purposes of this Note, trademarks will include service marks.  
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while trademark law is territorial, the Internet is universal. Trademark 
law permits more than one party to use the same trademark if using 
the same trademark does not create a likelihood of confusion. 
Conversely, the Internet allows only one party to own a particular 
domain name. 
Where more than one party is entitled to use a particular 
trademark, the use of that mark as a domain name does not constitute 
infringement, and the NSI awards the domain name to the first party 
who registers it.101 Consequently, the current system of domain name 
registration creates a disparity with trademark law because the first 
party to obtain a trademark registration may trump the rights of 
another party who in good faith registered the domain name. 
When applying the dilution standard, the courts determine which 
mark is more famous as opposed to concentrating on the issue of 
whether a given mark satisfies the famous requirement.102 The critical 
distinction lies between the first case, where the court is comparing 
the relative fame of the marks in dispute, and the latter case, where 
the court is determining the particular mark’s fame. While the courts 
seem to apply a comparison test, the latter situation is consistent with 
the language of the statute and congressional intent. If the FTDA 
protected marks because they were famous, then this situation does 
not address the problem of parties who may have a legitimate 
trademark in connection with the goods or services in non-competing 
markets in the case where neither party is the owner of a famous 
mark. The language utilized in the FTDA is vague and inconclusive. 
Consequently, courts continue to struggle when interpreting its 
language and, thus, apply it inconsistently. As the ACPA incorporates 
the language of the FTDA, courts are likely to encounter a similar 
struggle when applying dilution to domain name disputes.  
Moreover, likelihood of confusion is not required in order to 
establish a claim for dilution. Therefore, dilution is arguably easier to 
prove despite the fact that the defendant’s use does not rise to the 
level of infringement. This lower threshold seemingly favors the big 
fish over the little fish.103  
 
 101. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 102. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 103. G. Gervaise Davis, III, Internet Domain Names and Trademarks: A Growing Area of 
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Courts apply the statute inconsistently because the FTDA lists 
items that are overly broad and not necessary conditions for 
establishing fame. Consequently, the items listed in the ACPA will 
most likely yield inconsistent judicial opinions. The ACPA grants 
courts broad discretionary power when determining a party’s bad 
faith. As a result, courts may disregard ACPA’s listed factors or 
consider other factors. Thus, the lack of specific language defining 
bad faith may cause the same problems that arise in applying the 
FTDA. 
These issues, remain unaddressed by the ACPA and will 
potentially unleash a host of problems. Unless Congress amends the 
FTDA, or the courts reconcile their conflicts, the ACPA’s 
effectiveness will diminish. Moreover, the legislature should consider 
limiting the scope of the ACPA to prevent the problems experienced 
in applying the FTDA from emerging in the application of the ACPA. 
In effect, this statute may merely codify existing case law, as it 
addresses resolving disputes concerning a party who registers a 
domain name to extract a payment from the trademark owner. Courts, 
however, have successfully dealt with this issue by applying the 
dilution standard. Therefore, inserting the bad faith requirement is not 
only unnecessary, but it also creates more problems than it solves.  
Under the FTDA, damages are recoverable only if the plaintiff 
establishes that the infringer “willfully intended to trade on the 
owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark.”104 In 
contrast, the ACPA will change the Lanham Act to allow damages 
for a claim arising out of the newly created § 43(d)(1)(A).105 Section 
 
Domestic and International Disputes, 532 PLI/PAT 383, 390-91 (1998).  
Because there are many businesses with the same short, or common (take out comma) 
name, like “General” electric, telephone, atomics, etc., this has created an inevitable 
conflict. When a large business that has no domain name or Internet presence decides 
to register its name, it often finds that someone else has already registered it for their 
business. This sets the stage for a claim to trademark infringement or trademark 
dilution by the large company, against the domain name holder, who is often a small 
entity that registered the name in good faith, but without a trademark search or other 
legal advice.  
Id. 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (1999). 
 105. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., 875, F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 
1989). “Section 35(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1117(a)) is amended in the first 
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35(a), however, also states that “such sum . . . shall constitute 
compensation and not a penalty.”106 Currently, whether the 
imposition of damages under the ACPA is consistent with this 
provision remains unclear. 
V. DOMAIN NAME REGISTRATION OF IDENTICAL MARKS IN NON-
COMPETING MARKETS: UNRESOLVED ISSUES  
A. Domain Name Registration of Identical Marks in Non-Competing 
Markets as an Illustration of the Problem 
Traditional principles of trademark law allow multiple parties to 
use the same mark provided there is no likelihood of confusion. 
Currently, only one company can own a particular domain name. 
Therefore, only one of the several registered owners of an identical 
trademark may use the trademark as a domain name. This is 
significant because domain names are universal and represent a 
company’s goodwill. In the case of non-competing goods, both 
parties may use the mark in connection with specific goods or 
services. For example, one company can use the mark DELTA for an 
airline and another company can use it for faucets, but only one 
company can own “delta.com.”107 This apparent inconsistency 
exemplifies the problems of applying dilution principles to domain 
name disputes. Although the FTDA108 is arguably the strongest 
remedy against those who own similar domain names, it may also 
place at risk those whose domain names are owned by companies in 
non-competing markets. Moreover, the typical situation does not 
involve two large companies battling over the rights to use their 
trademark as a domain name. Instead, a majority of domain name 
disputes arise when a large company attempts to register its 
trademark and finds that someone else registered the domain name. 
Consequently, the large company files either a claim for trademark 
infringement or trademark dilution against the domain-name holder. 
 
sentence by inserting, ‘(c), or (d)’ after ‘section 43(a).’” Id. 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1999). 
 107. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1026. 
 108. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm’t Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. 
Wash. 1996). 
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Generally, the domain-name holder is a smaller company. Therefore, 
litigation expenses may create a disincentive. Recognize, however, 
that abuses on both sides of the domain-name/famous-mark 
dichotomy are possible. For example, the smaller company may 
register the trademark of a well-known company with the intent of 
trading on that company’s good will. This Note, however, does not 
address these latter cases but rather focuses on the issue of both 
parties having a legitimate claim to the same domain name.  
 The international registration of trademarks also exacerbates the 
problem of non-competing goods. An essential feature of trademark 
law is that it is geographic in nature. Trademark rights are granted in 
a specific territory and, as such, most trademarks are not enforceable 
beyond the territorial boundaries of the country, unless the party 
sought registration in other countries. In contrast, the Internet has no 
boundaries, but because it is universal, only one company may use a 
given trademark as its domain name.  
B. Reconciling the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
First, under paragraph (1)(B)(i)(I), a court may consider whether 
the domain name registrant owns any other intellectual property 
rights in the domain name.109 For example, the situation where both 
parties have a legitimate trademark or intellectual property right 
indicates that the party lacked the requisite “bad faith intent to 
profit.” The domain name, however, may not belong to the domain-
name holder despite the domain-name holder’s non-infringing use of 
the plaintiff’s mark under the ACPA. In fact, the ACPA does not 
resolve the dispute; it merely imposes penalties on those who 
intentionally trade on the goodwill or dilute the mark of another. 
Unless the conduct is willful or intentional, the ACPA does not 
regulate it, leaving courts with the dilemma without any legislative 
guidance.  
 
 109. See Abel supra note 10; see also 145 CONG. REC. H10823, 10825 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 
1999).  
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C. An Alternative Solution to the Domain Name Registration of 
Identical Marks in Non-Competing Markets 
Courts faced with the problem of two legitimate trademark owners 
seeking to register their mark as their domain name have a number of 
alternatives. First, they could uphold NSI’s first-come, first-served 
approach to registration. Under this system, whichever party wins the 
“race” to the registrar earns the domain name. This alternative is 
easily administered. Indeed, the role of courts may diminish. In 
effect, however, this alternative may increase the likelihood of 
confusion, especially when the famous mark loses the race. Second, 
the majority of courts applying dilution standards to domain-name 
disputes decide which party is the most famous thereby reducing the 
likelihood of dilution. The viability of this alternative will eventually 
depend on whether NSI modifies its policy of placing contested 
domain names on hold. Finally, courts could force the competing 
parties to co-exist by either choosing similar names or sharing a 
welcome page as evidenced in Mattel v. Hasbro.110 
The best way to address disputes between legitimate trademark 
owners is by distinguishing between the marks used in connection 
with non-competing goods and services and the marks used in 
connection with competing goods and services. For marks used in 
connection with non-competing goods and services, the parties 
should include in their domain name a word describing the nature of 
the goods or services provided. For example, both an airline and a 
faucet manufacturer use the mark “DELTA” in connection with non-
competing goods and services. According to this solution, DELTA 
Airlines would register the domain name “Delta.Airlines.com,” and 
the faucet manufacturer would register the domain name 
“Delta.Faucets.com.” Alternatively, parties using the same mark in 
connection with competing goods and services should share a 
welcome page that has a link to both of their respective sites. This 
option would reduce the likelihood of confusion. Parties could, 
however, obtain a domain name using their trademark knowing they 
could share a welcome page with another commercial entity of more 
 
 110. 128 A.2d 218 (1987). 
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The outcome of these conflicts is very uncertain, as courts and 
Congress continue adopting existing laws in response to rapidly 
emerging technologies. If use of a domain name as a trademark 
amounts to trademark use then amendments to current administrative 
policies of domain name registration should occur in uniformity with 
trademark law because current policies foster a race to register. Thus, 
domain name registration should parallel trademark law in that the 
organization handling domain name registrations should conduct a 
trademark search.  
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